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SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS
Carlos E. Lazarus*
SUCCESSIONS

Retour Successoral
Articles 908-910, which are the concluding articles in Book
III, Title I, Section 4, of the Louisiana Civil Code pertaining to
successions falling to ascendants, establish a right in the ascendant to the return of the things he has given to his descendant
who has died without posterity, but only when these things are
found in the succession of the donee. This right is a legal right
of return,' referred to as retour successoral, which gives the
ascendant donor the right to inherit the things given by him to
the de cujus who has died without having made any other disposition of them.2 In Succession of Christensen,8 the precise
question presented was whether property given by a grandmother to her grandchild was subject to the retour successoral
where the donee had died without posterity, but after having
bequeathed the property to her father. The court of appeal,
which adopted the decision of the trial court, had no difficulty
in concluding that since the property passed to the legatee under
the provisions of the will immediately upon the death of the
testatrix,4 the property was no longer in the succession of the
donee at the time of her death, and that therefore, article 908
of the Louisiana Civil Code was inapplicable."
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. This is distinguished from a conventional right of return authorized
by LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1534 and 1535 whereby the donor may stipulate for the
return of the things given if he survives the donee, or if he survives the
donee and his descendants.

2. This concept comes to Louisiana via art. 747 of the Code Napol6on
and the doctrine and jurisprudence thereunder. See 3 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, part I, Art. 908 (1940); 9 AUBREY ET RAU, DROIT cIVIL FRANgAIS no 608
(6th ed. 1953), in LAZARUS, 4 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS § 608 (1971).

This right

of return is also known as the "anomalous succession" because the property
is inherited by the donor and not necessarily by the heirs called by law to
the succession of the donee. See 3 RPERT ET BOULANGER, TRAiTt ELAMENTAIRE
DR DROIT CIVIL DE PLANIOL no 1762 (4th ed. 1951).

3. 248 So.2d 45 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
4. LA. CIr. CODE art. 1626.

5. This result is in accord with French doctrine and with the French
jurisprudence interpreting the corresponding provision of art. 747 of the
Code Napol6on. The reason given by the French in reaching the conclusion

that the property donated mortis causa is not found in the succession of the
donor is precisely the same as that given by the court in the present case:
In a testate succession, the legatee acquires the thing bequeathed at the
time of the death of the testator. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1626; 9 AUBRY ET
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TESTAMENTARY DISPOSrrIONS
Form-Olographicand Statutory Wills
In Succession of BarnettO the question at issue was the
validity of a testament in olographic form entirely written and
signed by the testatrix on the front side of a single sheet of
paper, but the date of execution was written by the testatrix
on the reverse side. Citing prior jurisprudence to the effect that
the date of an olographic will may be at the head, at the foot,
in the body of the instrument, and even after the signature of
the testator, 7 the Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit held
the will valid, noting that the testatrix had been "forced to
crowd her signature at the bottom of the page" and that it was
natural for her to turn the page over in order to write the date.
Succession of Peterson8 involved a statutory will in which,
following the dispositive provisions thereof, there was a declaration signed by the testator to the effect that he had executed
the same in the presence of the notary and the witnesses. This
declaration was followed by another clause, signed by the notary
and by the witnesses but not by the testator, which was substantially in the language suggested by the statute for an attestation clause. Proceeding from the proposition that an attestation clause is only a certification or recital of the acts done in
the confection of an instrument, the Court of Appeal for the
Second Circuit rejected the appellant's contention that the will
was invalid on the ground that the attestation clause was not
signed by the testator, and held that both clauses, when taken
together, satisfied the requirements of the statute.
In Succession of Morgan,9 the court of appeal had declared
a statutory will invalid on the ground that the attestation clause
was insufficient in that it failed to "evidence" that the instrument was the testatrix' last will and testament.' 0 The supreme
court reversed, holding that the attestation clause not only intended to, but that it actually did, reflect that the testatrix had
RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS no 608 (6th ed.
ELMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL DE PLANIOL no

1953); 3 RIPERT ET BOULANGER, TRAITS
1762 (4th ed. 1951).
6. 245 So.2d 418 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
7. Succession of Marshal, 126 So.2d 698 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
8. 240 So.2d 39 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 257 La. 175, 241 So.2d

532.
9. 230 So.2d 323 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
10. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970
Term-Success4ons and Donations, 31 LA. L. REV. 223, 229 (1970).
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stated, declared, affirmed, or in some definite manner, signified
that the instrument was her will."
Woodfork v. Sanders 2 was an action for damages instituted
by the universal legatee under a testament in a statutory form
against the testator's attorney who had allegedly prepared the
will. The will had been declared invalid by the probate court
on the ground that one of the two attesting witnesses was the
plaintiff-legatee himself. The action being one for damages suffered by the plaintiff because of the invalidity of the will, the
court found it necessary to re-examine the question as to its
validity vel non, even though the judgment declaring the same
invalid had already become final as to the heirs and the testamentary legatees. 1 The question at issue was whether or not
the provisions of article 1592 of the Civil Code, which disqualifies as a witness any person who is a legatee under the testament,'14 were applicable to attesting witnesses to a statutory will.
As the writer appreciates it, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal
took the position that because R.S. 9:2442-2443 provide a method
for making a will in addition to those methods provided for in
the Civil Code, the only qualifications required of witnesses to
a statutory will were those contained in R.S. 9:2443, namely the
ability to sign one's name and the ability to read.15 The court
was also of the opinion that article 1595 of the Civil Code 0 did
not apply to the statutory will because the language of the
11. Succession of Morgan, 257 La. 380, 242 So.2d 551 (1971). Actually,
the attestation clause used was substantially in the same language as that
suggested by the statute, except that the words "and declared" obviously
had been unintentionally omitted.
12. 248 So.2d 419 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971); See Note, 32 LA. L. REV. 153

(1971).
13. "Insofar as concerns testator's succession and the heirs in whose
favor this will was adjudged invalid, that judgment has apparently become
final for lack of a timely appeal . . . But that judgment does not bind de-

fendant, who was in no way a party to that proceeding .... Therefore, we
examine the question of the will's formal validity just as if we were ruling on
the will itself." 248 So.2d 419, 421 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).

14. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1592: "Neither can testaments be witnessed by
those who are constituted heirs or named legatees, under whatsoever title
it may be."

15. LA. R.S. 9:2443 (Supp. 1952) as amended, La. Acts 1964, No. 123, § 1:
"Except as provided in R.S. 9:2442 with respect to a testator who is physically unable to sign his name, those who know not how or are not able to
sign their names, and those who know not how or are not able to read,

cannot make dispositions in the form of the will provided for in R.S. 9:2442,
nor be attesting witnesses thereto." (Emphasis added.)
16. LA. COv. CODE art. 1595: "The formalities to which testaments are

subject by the provisions of the present section, must be observed; otherwise
the testaments are null and void." (Emphasis added.)
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statute creating the additional method of making wills precluded its application thereto. 17
The writer is unable to agree with these propositions: It is
true that R.S. 9:2443 requires that the witnesses know how and
be able to read and sign their names, but this does not necessarily preclude the application of other provisions of law in pari
8
The fact that R.S. 9:2442 provides for an additional
materia.1
making a will in accordance with the formalities
of
method
therein set forth, does not necessarily mean that the statute is
a self-contained instrument. If R.S. 9:2443 contains the only
qualifications for witnesses, a fortiori it would have to be concluded, from the very language of its provisions, that it contains
the only qualifications for testators, namely, their ability to read
and sign their names.' 0 Surely, it cannot be suggested that a
person who does not meet the qualifications of article 1475 of
the Civil Code20 is capable of making a statutory will because
he happens to know how and is able to read and sign his name.
As to the applicability of article 1595, it may very well be that
the language of R.S. 9:2442 implies that a statutory will not confected in the form therein provided is not valid. But if so, it is
simply restating the basic principle of article 1595. Besides, the
observance of the formalities required in making a testament
is totally different from the capacity of the parties to the testament. Both article 1595 of the Civil Code and R.S. 9:2442 would
then speak of the invalidity of wills for the non-observance of
the formalities required by law in the confection thereof. They
do not purport to declare the nullity of the instrument for the
17. "But the language of R.S. 9:2442 could hardly more clearly imply
that C.C. art. 1595 cannot invalidate a statutory will: 'In addition to the
methods provided in the Louisiana Civil Code, a will shall be valid if' the
statute's requirements are met.
"As a minimum, it appears that C.C. art. 1595 cannot apply to statutory
wills. Accordingly, even if art. 1592 were held applicable, the possibility of
limiting its effect to invalidating only the legacy to the witness, and not the
entire will, seems very strong." Woodfork v. Sanders, 248 So.2d 419, 423 (La.
App. 4th Cir 1971) It is submitted that this last suggestion does violence to
the very language of article 1592 and that a will otherwise valid in form
and attested by a sufficient number of competent witnesses, will be valid;
the fact that it is also attested by a witness who is a legatee would invalidate neither the will nor his legacy.
18. LA. CIV. CODE art. 17.
19. LA. R.S. 9:2443 (Supp. 1952) as amended, La. Acts 1964, No. 123, § 1.
See note 15 supra.
20. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1475: "To make a donation either inter vivos or
mortis causa, one must be of sound mind." See also LA. Civ. CODE art. 1476
which prohibits minors under sixteen years of age from disposing mortis
causa.
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lack of capacity of the parties thereto. As the court itself states:
"[t]he basic prohibition of art. 1592 (taken by itself) is against
one being both witness and legatee (the purpose being presumably to avoid undue influence, imposition or fraud) .'21 If
this is true with regard to the nuncupative testaments of the
Civil Code, why should it not be true also of the statutory will?
What is there about the statutory will that immunizes it from
the possibility of undue influence, imposition, or fraud?
Usufruct of the Surviving Spouse
In Succession of McCrary,22 the Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit reversed the lower court and held that a legacy of
all the property of the testator to his wife "so long as she does
live" constituted a legacy of the usufruct of such property, and
not a legacy in full ownership; consequently, the naked ownership thereof devolved ab intestato by operation of law on the
28
heirs of the testatrix.

In all cases where a predeceased spouse leaves issue of the
marriage without having disposed of his share in the community
property, the survivor is entitled to the usufruct of such property as is inherited by the issue of the marriage. This usufruct
terminates, however, if the survivor contracts a second marriage. 24 In Succession of Chauvin,25 the testator, whose patrimony
consisted solely of his share in the community of acquits, made
the following disposition:
"I leave all I die possessed of to my son Bernard Chauvin
Jr., subject to the usufruct thereon which I leave to my lov26
ing wife, Bernice." (Emphasis added.)
21. Woodfork v. Sanders, 248 So.2d 419, 422 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
22. 246 So.2d 899 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 258 La. 770, 247 So.2d

866, 869 (1971).
23. The court based its conclusion on Succession of Weller, 107 La. 466,
31 So. 883 (1902) and Succession of Verneuille, 120 La. 605, 45 So. 520 (1908),
in which the legacies were, respectively: "to my husband 'to be his so long
as he lives'" and "to my wife for her lifetime." Succession of Johnson, 223
La. 1058, 67 So.2d 591 (1953) and Succession of Heft, 163 La. 467, 112 So. 301
(1927) are distinguished.
24. LA. Civ. CoDE art. 916.
25. 242 So.2d 340 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
26. Id. at 341. It is quite apparent from the reference to the usufruct
that the testator had in mind the provisions of Civil Code article 916; it is
also clear that the dispositions he made of his share in the community
would have been the same that the law would have made had he died intestate.
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Since the surviving widow remarried soon after the death of
the testator, the question presented was whether or not her subsequent marriage had the effect of terminating the usufruct over
the deceased's share in the community. Relying on the cases of
Smith v. Nelson 27 and Succession of Carbajal,28 the Court of
Appeal for the Fourth Circuit rejected the appellant's contention that the testament had simply confirmed the legal usufruct
given to the surviving spouse by article 916 and held that the
usufruct given by that article had been converted into a testamentary usufruct which, for that very reason, did not terminate
upon the remarriage of the usufructuary, except as to that portion of the patrimony of the deceased that constituted the l6gi29
time of the son.
With all due respect, the writer is compelled to disagree.
Although the court finds that Smith v. Nelson and Succession of
Carbajal stand for the proposition that a 916 usufruct becomes
a testamentary usufruct when conferred by will,80 these cases
do not so hold. A careful reading of Smith v. Nelson will reveal
that, but for the testamentary disposition in his favor, the surviving spouse in that case would not have been entitled to the
usufruct over the community property involved, simply because
the property of that community was inherited, not by the issue
of the marriage, but by the children of the deceased spouse by
a prior marriage.31 In other words, there was no transformation
27. 121 La. 170, 46 So. 200 (1908).
28. 154 La. 1060, 98 So. 666 (1924).
29. "In the instant case the son inherited the naked ownership of his
father's estate and his legitime has been burdened with a usufruct in favor

of his mother. It is true that Article 916 confers on the surviving spouse in
community the usufruct of the decedent's interest in the community, leaving

issue of the marriage with the naked ownership. But, construing both codal
articles in pari materiae [sic] [LA. Civ. CODE arts. 916, 1493) we conclude
Article 916 is a statutory exception to the general rule enunciated in Article
1493, an exception which a testator cannot exceed and which restricts him
to all of the provisions of Article 916, including, insofar as the legitime is
concerned, termination of the usufruct upon a second marriage." Succession

of Chauvin, 242 So.2d 340, 342 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
30. "Thus our jurisprudence holds that a donation mortis causa of the
usufruct of community property to the surviving spouse confers a lifetime
usufruct which is not terminated by a subsequent marriage. This is true
even if the testament grants the same usufruct the survivor would have acquired by operation of law under L.S.A.-C.C. Art. 916 in an intestate succession."

(Emphasis added.)

Id.

31. See the analysis made by the court on the factual situation in Smith
v. Nelson: "In Smith . . . the testatrix's second husband was sent into possession of the usufruct of all her property acquired during the second community while three children, issue of a prior marriage, inherited in

full
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of a 916 usufruct into a testamentary usufruct. Indeed, in all
cases in which a usufruct is granted to a person who is not
entitled to it by law, the usufruct is conventional rather than
legal,8 2 and the usufructuary will be treated accordingly. 83 But
where the usufruct given by testament is one to which the usufructuary is otherwise entitled by law, the granting of such usufruct should be regarded only as a confirmation of such usufruct,
and it has been so held by the supreme court.8 4 The error into
which the Court of Appeal for the 4th Circuit seems to have
fallen is in accepting the Nelson and Carbajal cases as establishing a non-existing jurisprudential rule35 that the donation
6
mortis causa of a 916 usufruct confers a lifetime usufruct8
It should also be noted that the usufruct established by
article 916 of the Civil Code is on the entire share of the deceased
in the community, or on so much thereof as is inherited by the
issue of the marriage, so that if the patrimony of the deceased
consists solely of his share in the community, the usufruct will
attach not only to the disposable portion thereof, but also to
the portion reserved by law for the heirs, the reason why a
ownership all the assets of the first community and the naked ownership
of the second." (Emphasis added.) Id.
It is evident that the surviving spouse could not have had the legal
usufruct of the second community under article 916, for the heirs inheriting
the same were not the issue of the marriage. It is also evident that the
usufruct thus granted to the surviving spouse could only have affected the
disposable portion of that community. LA. Civ. CoDE art. 1710.
32. LA. CIV. CODE art. 540: "Usufruct may be established by all sorts of
titles; by deed of sale, by marriage contract, by donation, compromise, exchange, last will and even by operation of law.
"Thus the usufruct to which a father is entitled on the estate of his
children during the marriage, is a legal usufruct."
33. Bee Succession of Carlisi, 217 La. 675, 47 So.2d 42 (1950), where the
testator, leaving no descendants nor ascendants, bequeathed to his surviving
spouse the usufruct of all his property, which consisted solely of his share
in the community, and the naked ownership thereof to a charitable institution. It is clear, and the court so holds, that this was not a legal usufruct
which would exempt the usufructuary from giving security because articles
915 and 916 are inapplicable under these circumstances.
34. Winsberg v. Winsberg, 233 La. 67, 96 So.2d 44 (1957); Succession of
Moore, 40 La. Ann. 531, 4 So. 460 (1888).
35. Succession of Carbajal, 154 La. 1060, 98 So. 666 (1924), the only other
case cited by the court, dealt solely with the question of whether or not
a testament fell by the subsequent birth of a posthumous child where provision for the unborn child had been made in the testament. It Is only in
a four-line per curiam opinion that reference is made to Smith v. Nelson,
and then it is unclear upon which property the usufruct was given, nor is
it shown whether the property, if community, was inherited by the issue of
the marriage or by someone else.
36. If such were the rule, the usufructuary would be required to give
security because, not being a legal usufructuary, the provisions of article 560
of the Civil Code would be inapplicable.
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bequest of such a usufruct does not violate the provisions of
article 1710 of the Civil Code 37 is that such a usufruct is legal
8
rather than testamentary.
It logically follows that a usufruct of the kind conferred
by will in Chauvin must be considered in its entirety as a legal
usufruct, and that such a usufruct must stand or fall in its entirety. It cannot be a testamentary usufruct as to a portion of
the property on which it bears, and a legal usufruct as to
another. Actually, the decision in Chauvin means that when
the usufruct given by testament is over that portion of the community property that constitutes the l6gitime of the issue of the
marriage, the usufruct is a legal usufruct which terminates upon
the remarriage of the usufructuary; but when the usufruct thus
given affects only the disposable portion, the usufruct is transformed into a testamentary usufruct for life. However, there
seems to be no basis for this either in the legislation or in the
jurisprudence.
ProhibitedSubstitutions
A testament is a declaration of last will clothed with certain
formalities whereby a person disposes of the totality or a portion
of his patrimony, or a particularly designated thing in favor of
one or more persons.3 9 Implicit in this definition are the concepts that a testament may contain as many distinct dispositions
or bequests as there are legatees to whom they are made, and
that each such bequest is essentially independent of the others,
so that the invalidity, caducity, or revocation of one or more of
the dispositions in the testament does not affect the validity of
the others.4 These concepts are so elementary that they do not
37. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1710: "[Plrovided, however, that no charges or
conditions can be imposed by the testator on the legitimate portion of forced
heirs ...

"

38. "It is true that Moore could not incumber the portion for which his
children are forced heirs, that is, their legitime; but the fact is that he has
not done so, for the incumbrance is placed upon it by law, independent of
his participation. All Moore did was to confirm it. It would have existed
without the confirmation which is practically a superfluity." (Emphasis

added.)

Succession of Moore, 40 La. Ann. 531, 537, 4 So. 460, 463 (1888).

39. LA. Cxv. CODE arts. 1469, 1570, 1571.
40. "The various dispositions made in

a testament do not form an es-

sentially indivisible whole. Thus, when a testament contains several legacies,
the validity of each legacy is independent from the validity of the others,
unless the testator has manifested a contrary intent." 10 ATJBRY ET RAU,
DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS, no

§ 647, at 24 (1969).

647 (6th ed. 1954) in

LAZARus, 3 CIvIL LAW TRANSLATIONS
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appear to have ever been questioned in the past. On the contrary, in those cases in which the validity of a particular testamentary disposition has been at issue, the other valid dispositions of the testament have been upheld, 41 and the only question that was presented was whether or not such legacies as had
become caducous or declared invalid for any reason were payable to the heirs ab intestato or to the universal legatee. 42 Nevertheless, in Succession of Walters,43 the appellants contended that
the presence of a bequest creating a prohibited substitution had
the effect of rendering null all the other testamentary dispositions, and strongly urged the court to declare the entire will
of the testator invalid. The appellants relied solely upon the
following statement made for the first time in Succession of
44
Johnson:
"Whilst that article [Civil Code Article 1520] at first
blush would seem to indicate that substitutions and fidei
commissa are one and the same thing and affect the validity
of the will in the same manner, it is undoubtedly settled
by the jurisprudence of this State that there are differences
between them and that it is very important to note the
differences because in cases of prohibited substitutions the
whole will is stricken with nullity whereas in cases of fidei
commissa, it is only the dispositions which are tainted with
that designation that are invalid. '' 45 (Emphasis added.)
41. See Succession of Hunter, 159 La. 492, 105 So. 596 (1925) (the prohibited substitution and the legacy containing an impossible condition did not affect the validity of other special legacies which were left intact); Succession
of Ledbetter, 147 La. 771, 85 So. 908 (1920) (prohibited substitution only was
annulled); Succession of Herber, 117 La. 239, 41 So. 559 (1906) (prohibited
substitution in a testament did not Invalidate other legacies, particularly the
residuary universal legacy).
In Succession of Smart, 214 La. 63, 36 So.2d 639 (1948), involving a
testament containing thirteen particular legacies and a residuary universal
legacy, two of the particular legacies being prohibited substitutions, the
court said: "The fact that there are bequests of particular legacies in the
will that contain prohibited provisions or substitutions such would destroy
only the legacies and would not effect the will as a whole. It is well settled
that the invalidity of a portion of a will does not destroy the will in its entirety." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 67, 36 So.2d at 640-41.
42. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1702. Succession of Burnside, 35 La. Ann. 708
(1883); Compton v. Prescot, 12 Rob. 56 (La. 1845); Prevost v. Martell, 10
Rob. 512 (La. 1845).
43. 243 So.2d 324 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 258 La. 249, 245
So.2d 717 (1971).
44. 223 La. 1058, 67 So.2d 591 (1953).
45. Succession of Johnson, 223 La. 1058, 1067, 67 So.2d 591, 594 (1953). It
will be noted that no authority is cited in support of this statement. But
see Dufour v. Deresheid, 110 La. 344, 347, 34 So. 469, 470 (1903).
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It should be noted that in Succession of Johnson, the court was
inquiring into the validity of the only disposition contained in a
testament whereby the testator bequeathed to the second named
legatee what was left after the death of the first named legatee.
This was practically the identical proposition that had previously
been presented to the court in Dufour v. Deresheid,46 from
which the court in Johnson quoted at length and on which it
relied 47 in concluding that the legacy of the residuum was not
prohibited by article 1520 of the Civil Code. But it will also be
noted that in the Deresheid case, the statement made by the
court concerning the distinction between a substitution and a
fidei commissum is materially different:
"It is only in cases of substitution that the entire disposition of a will is null. In cases of fidei commissa, pure and
simple, that clause alone creating the fidei commissum is
null as in violation of law, leaving unaffected the validity
48
of the disposing clause or main donation."
There is every reason to assume, therefore, that all the
court in Johnson intended to say was that in cases of a prohibited substitution the entire disposition, that is the institution
as well as the substitution, is null, and that the reference to the
"entire will" was totally inadvertent. It is the opinion of the
writer that, in rejecting the appellant's contention and in refusing to declare the testament invalid in its entirety, the court
in Succession of Walters reached the correct result, ahd one
49
which is supported by French doctrine and jurisprudence.
46. 110 La. 344, 34 So. 469 (1903).
47. "That [the quotation from the Deresheid opinion] is a statement of
the law as it may well be applied in the present case." Succession of Johnson, 223 La. 1058, 1072, 67 So.2d 591, 596 (1953).
48. Dufour v. Deresheid, 110 La. 344, 347, 34 So. 469, 470 (1903).
49. "When in the same act there are several dispositions one of which is
tainted with substitution, the nullity of this disposition does not in any
manner affect the fate of the others. Particularly, the nullity of a universal
legacy containing a substitution has no effect on the validity of particular
legacies contained in the same testament, on legacies which will have to be
paid by the heirs ab-intestato, or on the validity of the clause revoking a
prior testament, though such testament had been made in favor of the same
legatee. It will be otherwise if the substitution which apparently affects
only one of the dispositions, can be considered as in effect affecting the
other dispositions as well." 11 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAis no 694 (6th
ed. 1956) in LAZARUS, 3 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS § 694, at 328 (1969).

"The nullity of the substitution thus carries with it the nullity of the
entire disposition which contains it. But if several distinct dispositions independent from one another are contained in the same testament, the nullity
of the disposition tainted with a substitution, will not affect the others.
Thus: a testament contains a legacy of an immovable with a charge on the
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Excessive Donations-Reduction by Creditors
As is clearly indicated by articles 1493 and following of the
Louisiana Civil Code, the l6gitime of a forced heir is that portion of the patrimony of the disposer which, because it cannot
be alienated by the latter to the prejudice of the former, must
remain essentially inalienable to descend upon the heir by operation of law.50 The right to the l6gitime is, therefore, a right
of succession arising ab intestato5' which is protected by law by
the action of reduction, which is but an action to revendicate
the property from the donee or his transferee, as the case may
be, in order to have the same returned to the mass of the succession of the disposer, 52 so that the forced heir may receive
the same ab intestato.
The forced heir, however, need not enforce his right to the
16gitime. Indeed, he need not claim any portion of the succession of the de cujus, and may even renounce it in toto; 3 but
having become seized of it upon the death of the de cujus, and
having become the owner thereof immediately upon the death
of the latter,5 4 his action in refusing to assert his rights thereto
or in formally renouncing it, constitutes an alienation of the
property in fraud of the rights of his creditors, and thus, the
latter are given the right to accept it in his place and stead to
the extent that they have been prejudiced by the renunciation
or the refusal. 55
However, in Succession of Henican,5 the Court of Appeal
for the Fourth Circuit denied the creditor of the heir the right
to avail himself of the provisions of articles 1021 and 1990 of
the Civil Code, seemingly on the grounds that a creditor is
legatee to preserve and render the same to
his death; the same testament also contains
made purely and simply to another legatee;
of the first legacy could not result in the

a third person at the time of
a legacy of another immovable
it is manifest that the nullity
nullity of the second." 6 Huc,
COMMENTAIRE THIORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DU CODE CIVIL no. 27, at 43 (1894). To the
same effect, see also 27 DEMOLOMBE, COURS DE CODE NAPOLtON no. 178 (1876);
12 LAURENT,
BOULANGER,

PRINCIPLES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS no. 511 (1876); 3 RIPERT
s
TRAIT1 ELtMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL DE PLANIOL no
3884-86 (4th

ET

ed.

1951).
50. See particularZy LA. Cirv. CODE arts. 1493-1496, 1498, 1502, 1710.
51. Succession of Turnell, 32 La. Ann. 1218 (1880); 11 AUBRY ET RAU,
DROiT CIVIL FRANqAIS 679 (6th ed. 1956) in LAZARUS, 3 CIVIL LAw TRANSLATIONS
§ 679, at 191 (1969).
52. LA. Cirv. CODE arts. 1516-1518.
53. LA. CIV. CODE art. 977.
54. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 940 et seq., 1292.
55. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1021, 1990.

56. 248 So.2d 385 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
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neither a forced heir nor an heir or assign of forced heirs, and
therefore, has no right under the provisions of article 1504 to
institute the action of reduction. 57 The decision leaves one with
the impression that the word "assigns" as used in article 1504
of the Louisiana Civil Code is more limited in scope than the
term "ayant cause" which is used in the text of the corresponding article 921 of the Code Napol6on under which, the court
asserts, creditors are entitled to bring the action of reduction.58
Actually, however, the term "ayant cause" in French law means
"assigns" and is no more extensive than the word "assigns."
It has reference only to persons who derive their rights from
another, including his heirs, legatees and donees, but it excludes
creditors.59 A comparison of the text of the Code Napoleon
article with the original French text of article 29, page 215, of
the Digest of 1808, and with the French text of article 1491 of
the Code of 1825, will reveal that the language used in all three
is identical.60 It will also be noted that the term "ayant cause"
57. The decision is based on Tompkins v. Prentice, 12 La. Ann. 465 (1857).
There, as in this case, the forced heir of the deceased who had been excluded
from the testator's will and had been virtually disinherited, failed to assert
his claim to the portion reserved to him by law, whereupon the creditor of
the heir sought the authority to accept the succession in the name of the
heir and to be sent into possession of the lgitime to the extent of the heir's
indebtedness to him. In a 3-2 decision (the personnel of the supreme court
then numbered five), the supreme court held that the creditor had no right
of action because the action to reduce a donation could be brought only by
the forced heirs of the disposer, or by his heirs or assigns, the term assigns
not including the creditors of the heir.
58. This statement is apparently based on language found in the dissenting opinion by Spofford. J., in the Prentice case where it is said: "It will be
observed that the word "assigns" Is "ayants-cause"in the French text, and
that, in this particular, the article is literally taken from Article 921 of the
Code Napoleon. It will also be observed that the word ayants-cause in article
921 of the latter Code, is held by the French authorities, with entire unanimity, to embrace personal creditors of the heir." Tompkins v. Prentice, 12
La. Ann. 465, 470 (1857). But see note 59 infra.
59. In DALLOZ, PETIT DICCIONAIRE DE DROIT 157 (Paris 1951), the term is defined as follows:
"AYANT CAUSE. L'ayant cause est celui qui tient son droit d'une autre
personne que l'on d~nomme auteur. On distingue les ayants cause a titre
uni-versel et les ayants cause 4 ttre particulter. Les premiers sont ceux
qui recueillent tout ou partie du patrimoine de leur auteur d6c6d6. Ce sont
les hritiers ab intestat, les lgataires universels ou h titre universel et les
donataires de biens A venir. On ne peut assimiler les creanciers chirographaires 4 des ayants cause 4 titre universel. Les ayants cause a titre particulier sont ceux qui acquierent soit par un act entre vifs, soit par un legs
particulier un droit sur un objet determine." See also the French authorities
cited in note 61 infra.
60. In the French Code the action is given to "leurs hdritiers ou ayantcause." In article 28, page 215 of the Digest, and in the French text of art.
1491 of the Code of 1825, the phrase used is "leurs h~ritiers ou ayans-cause."
The difference in spelling is inconsequential.
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was translated as "assigns" in both the Digest and the Code of
1825. In light of the meaning of the term in French law this is
as accurate a translation as it is possible to make. The court
of appeal is correct, however, in stating that in France, the
creditors of the heir are permitted to bring the action of reduction. The reason for this is not that article 921 of the French
Code is broader than the provisions of our article 1504, but rather
the fact that creditors may always accept a succession which
their debtor has renounced or refused to accept, and the only way
in which effect can be given to this right is by permitting the
creditor to institute the action of reduction which their debtor
could have instituted"' and which, when exercised by a creditor,
62
is in the nature of a revocatory action.
The further holding of the Court of Appeal seems likewise
unwarranted; it held that article 1991, which enumerates the
rights of a debtor which a creditor may not exercise, is illustrative and that when read in pari materia with article 1504, precluded the creditor from bringing the action of reduction. Article 1991 lists only purely personal actions and does not expressly
deny creditors the right to sue for reduction, and to so construe
it is tantamount to holding that the rights granted to crediors
by articles 1021 and 1990 to accept the successions falling to their
debtors are only illusory. 68
61. "The law thus gives to the forced heirs in general . .. as well as
to their ayants-cause, the right to demand the reduction or revendication
of liberalities which impinge upon the reserved portion ....
"This right can, in the first place, be exercised by the forced heirs themselves ....
"This right, being part of the patrimony of the person invested with it,
Is transmissible to the heirs of the latter as well as to his legatees; it Is
assignable either by itself or as part of the mass of the succession rights
of the heir, and it may be exercised by the creditors of the latter by virtue
of article 1166." 6 Huc, COMMENTAIRE THIPORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DU CODE CIVIL
no. 163 (1894); cf. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1969. As Marcad6 has observed, even if
art. 921 of the French Code (LA. Civ. CODE art. 1504) had said that the reduction could be sued for only by forced heirs, and had omitted the phrase "and
their heirs or ayants cause," still, the right of the creditors of the forced
heir to take his place and to sue for the reduction would have resulted from
other provisions of the Code.

II (7th ed. 1873).

3 MARCAD9,

EXPLICATION DU CODE CIVIL 921, no.

To the effect that the creditors of the heir may bring the

action of reduction as a right which the heir himself could have brought by

virtue of articles 1166 and 1167 of the Code Napoldon, see 11 AUBRY ET RAU,
DROIT CIVIL PRANQAIS no 685 (6th ed. 1956) in LAZARUS, 3 CIVIL LAw TRANSLATIONS
§ 685, at 237 (1969); 3 RIPERT ET BOULANGER, TRAIT2 ELIMENTAIR5 DE DROIT CIVIL
DE PLANIOL no 2727 (4th ed. 1951).
62. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1968, 1969, 3182, 3183. 3 MARCADA, EXPLICATION
DU CODE CIvIL, on art. 921, no. II (7th ed. 1873).
63. It is true that creditors cannot accept a donation inter v'ivos made

to their debtor, nor can they sue for collation. But the reason for this Is

